How might artificial intelligence (AI) change the way militaries plan and fight campaigns? RAND researchers developed Camp(ai)gn, an unclassified operational-level wargame, to explore that question. In this paper, the authors offer initial takeaways from ten iterations of Camp(ai)gn featuring a hypothetical 2035 U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan and played by more than 20 RAND researchers and affiliates.
From these games, the authors developed six observations about how AI-enabled autonomous systems could affect campaign planning and execution. First, autonomous systems could enable new forms of limited conflict—graduated, low-intensity operations fought primarily with robotic systems. Second, these limited conflicts could produce distinctive escalation dynamics and end states that differ from canonical visions of great-power wars. Third, autonomous mass could become especially important during protracted conflicts, potentially in ways that favor China. Fourth, autonomous mass could expand the commander’s decision space and reshape familiar operational trade-offs, though it also increases the decisionmaking burden on commanders. Fifth, AI and autonomous systems could introduce new roles for allies—in self-defense, direct combat participation, and coalition production. Sixth, attacking an adversary’s data centers is unlikely to deliver decisive operational effects or prove to be an Achilles’ heel for AI-enabled forces.
The authors end by emphasizing that these observations reflect gameplay-generated hypotheses, not established conclusions, and they point toward specific lines of inquiry—on force structure, countermeasures, allied integration, and defense industrial capacity—that warrant further research.
This publication is part of the RAND expert insights series. The expert insights series presents perspectives on timely policy issues.
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